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Key Threats of Statelessness in the Post-Secession Sudanese and South 
Sudanese Nationality Regimes 
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
  
 
Following the secession of South Sudan from Sudan on 9 July 2011, both countries have 
passed new citizenship legislation with dramatic effects for the rights of individuals on both 
sides of the new border.  While the South Sudanese nationality provisions appear generous, 
its regime is at once both over and under-inclusive.  It grants citizenship to a broad range of 
persons with little connection to South Sudan but fails to guarantee citizenship for individuals 
habitually resident in South Sudan and children born in South Sudan to stateless, 
undocumented or foreign parents.  The Sudanese Act provides for the automatic 
denationalisation of South Sudanese nationals only and reserves to its own authorities the 
discretion to determine whether South Sudanese nationality has been acquired.  This will 
lead to de jure statelessness as individuals denationalised by operation of the Sudanese law 
struggle to establish their nationality claims in South Sudan.  Those individuals who have 
acquired South Sudanese citizenship but remain in Sudan are left as de facto stateless in the 
continuing absence of effective state protection from South Sudan.   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Following the secession of the Republic of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan
1
 on 9 
July 2011
2
, both states have passed new citizenship laws with serious implications for the 
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protection of individuals on both sides of the border and, in particular, individuals of South 
Sudanese origin remaining in Sudan.  The new state of South Sudan has promulgated an 
entirely new Nationality Act
3
 (hereinafter the NASS), while Sudan has introduced a number 
of significant amendments to the 1994 Sudanese Nationality Act (hereinafter the SNA).
4
  I 
have recently published an extended analysis of the resulting nationality regime that describes 
its key features in some detail.
5
  The two laws combine to produce a substantially increased 
risk of both de jure and de facto statelessness.  This paper seeks to explain the principle 
causes of these key protection threats.  
 
2.  The General Position Following State Succession 
 
The new Sudanese nationality regime makes aggressive provision for the automatic 
denationalization of individuals as they obtain the citizenship of South Sudan.
6
  Provision for 
involuntary denationalisation, following acquisition of a foreign nationality, are common 
among states that seek to avoid dual or multiple nationality.
7
  However, this is normally done 
only in those cases where a person acquires foreign nationality on a voluntary basis or retains 
it following acquisition by automatic/ex lege operation of law.
8
  Where an individual is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
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2
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3
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denationalised in advance of their voluntary acquisition (or retention) of a foreign nationality 
they will frequently be rendered as de jure stateless.  If these measures are implemented in a 
manner that fails to appropriately balance the legitimate interests of the state and the 
individual, this will constitute a violation of the guarantee against arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality found in Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
9
 and now 
part of customary international law.
10
  Bearing in mind the impact statelessness will have on 
the individual, any deprivation which results in statelessness will be arbitrary, save when this 
is done in response to the most pressing needs of the state.
11
  As explained by UNHCR in 
their reply to the report of the UN Secretary-General on the arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality:  
 
                                                          
9
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10
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there is, arguably, 'a negative duty not to create statelessness', so that any deprivation must be accompanied by 
strict rules of procedure and should not result in statelessness.’ Carol A. Batchelor, ‘Stateless Persons: Some 
Gaps in International Protection’ 7(2) IJRL 232, 238; J.M.M. Chan 'Nationality as a Human Right', 12 HRLJ 11, 
18; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn OUP 2012) 516.  
11
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The avoidance of statelessness is a general principle of international law. Deprivation 
of nationality resulting in statelessness will generally be arbitrary unless it serves a 
legitimate purpose and complies with the principle of proportionality. Thus, article 8 of 
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness allows for a limited set of 
circumstances under which deprivation of nationality resulting in statelessness is 
permissible, but as exceptions to a general principle they must be narrowly construed.
12
  
 
There is, however, considerable state practice supporting the involuntary substitution of 
nationality in the context of state succession.
13
  As explained by Hudson,  
 
If the effects of the cession on the nationality of the inhabitants of the ceded territory 
are regulated by treaty, such treaties usually provide that the nationality of the 
predecessor State is lost by the conferment of nationality by the successor State.  Where 
the transfer of territory and the conferment of nationality is in accordance with 
international law, the predecessor State is obliged to recognize it.  Its sovereignty has 
been replaced by that of the successor State (…)14 
 
Habitual residence is the test most frequently used to assess the connection between the 
individual citizen and a successor state.
15
  This test achieves two key policy goals.  First, it 
                                                          
12
 Report of the Secretary-General (n 10), para 51. 
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of another nationality (…) by operation of law (…)’ Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International 
Law (2nd edn, Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers BV 1979) 116.   
14
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ensures that individuals in receipt of citizenship have a genuine or effective link with the state 
in question.
16
  Second, it ensures that in practice the individuals who acquire citizenship of a 
state will actually be resident in that state.   
 
3.  South Sudanese Approach 
 
 In contrast with widely accepted international practice, the NASS does not rely on habitual 
residence in South Sudan as a test for acquisition of its citizenship.  Instead, this Act relies on 
connections with the indigenous ethnic communities
17
 or individuals born
18
 in South Sudan.  
The NASS does include a reference to ‘domicile’ which, as used in the Act, is roughly 
synonymous with the concept of habitual residence.
19
  However, the application of this 
concept is limited to those individuals or, for those individuals claiming citizenship through 
an operative relative, their parent or grand-parent, ‘domiciled’ in South Sudan continuously 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Comprehensive Proposal for the Republic of Kosova Status Settlement’) ‘29.1 All persons who on 1 January 
1998 were citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and on that day were habitually residing in Republic 
of Kosova shall be citizens of Republic of Kosova and shall be registered as such in the register of citizens 
irrespective of their current residence or citizenship.’. 
16
 Rezek explains, ‘(…) the judicial relationship of nationality should not be based on formality or artifice, but 
on a real connection between the individual and the state.’ J.F. Rezek, ‘Le Droit International de la Nationalite’ 
in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Vol 198, Martinus Nijihoff 1987) 357; see 
also the views of UNHCR in the context of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, ‘(…) it is in the interest of the 
successor State (…) to come as close as possible, when defining its initial body of citizens, to the definition of 
persons having a genuine link with that State.  If a number of persons are considered to be “foreigners” in “their 
own country” clearly that is not in the interest of the State itself.’ UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe ‘The 
Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness’ in Citizenship in the Context of the 
Dissolution of Czechoslovakia European Series Vol 2(4) September 1996 (both cited in ILC Draft Articles (n 
7), art. 5 commentary). 
17
 ‘A person born before or after this Act has entered into force shall be considered a South Sudanese National 
by birth if such person meets any of the following requirements: (b) such person belongs to one of the 
indigenous ethnic communities of South Sudan.’ South Sudanese Nationality Act 2011 (n 3), art. 8(1)b. 
18
 ‘A person born before or after this Act has entered into force shall be considered a South Sudanese National 
by birth if such person meets any of the following requirements: (a) any Parents, grandparents or great-
grandparents of such a person, on the male or female line, were born in South Sudan’ Nationality Act (South 
Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(1)a. 
19
 A person shall be considered a South Sudanese National by birth, if at the time of the coming into force of this 
Act: (a) he or she has been domiciled in South Sudan since 1.1.1956; or (b) if any of his or her parents or 
grandparents have been domiciled in South Sudan since 1.1.1956’ Nationality Act (South Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(2); 
Sanderson (n 5), 209-212. 
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since 1 January 1956.
20
  This has two key implications.  First, a wide range of individuals 
with familial and ethnic affinities to South Sudan will acquire South Sudanese citizenship ex 
lege without any guarantee that they will have a practical or effective link with the new state 
as might otherwise be established by their habitual residence.  Second, there will continue to 
be a group of individuals that are actually habitually resident in South Sudan but cannot 
acquire citizenship due to their lack of a relevant familial or ethnic connection.  The resulting 
nationality regime is at once both over and under-inclusive.  
 
This situation is aggravated by the absence of a general ius soli right to citizenship for 
children born in South Sudan.  Whereas Article 8(4) of the South Sudanese Act contains a 
modified ius soli right, its application is restricted to children found in South Sudan ‘(…) as a 
deserted infant of unknown parents (…)’.21  No provision is made for children who are born 
in South Sudan to parents who are themselves stateless or citizens of states that adhere 
strictly to the principle of ius soli, and so are unable to pass on their citizenship to children 
born abroad.
22
  For those children born to stateless parents this will mean that statelessness is 
passed on from generation to generation like a hereditary disease.
23
  This issue is specifically 
addressed in Article 13 of the ILC Draft Articles, 
 
                                                          
20
 1 January 1956 was the date of Sudan’s independence from Britain and Egypt, see PM Holt and MW Daly A 
History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day (6th edn, Longman 2011) ch. 11. 
21
 The Nationality Act (South Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(4). 
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 1961 Statelessness Convention (n 10), art. 1(a), 4; Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3, art. 7; 
Report of the Secretary-General (n 10),  para 37; ‘In view of the nearly universal ratification of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the principle of jus soli (citizenship based on the place of birth) has emerged as the 
overriding international norm governing the nationality of children born to non-citizen parents.’ David 
Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (OUP 2008) 75. 
23
 Hudson (n 13),  para 17.  
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A child of a person concerned, born after the date of the succession of States, who has 
not acquired any nationality, has the right to the nationality of the State concerned on 
whose territory that child was born.
24
  
 
The ILC Draft Articles are otherwise limited to considering ‘(…) nationality solely in relation 
to the occurrence of a succession of States.’25  In this case the ILC recognized ‘(…) the need 
for an exception from the rigid definition ratione temporis (…) for addressing also the 
problem of children born after the succession of States from parents whose nationality (…) 
has not been determined.’26 
 
4.  Sudanese Approach 
 
The impact of the South Sudanese citizenship provisions can only be properly understood 
when they are examined together with the denationalisation provisions of the SNA.  Article 
10(2) of the amended SNA provides that ‘A person will automatically lose his Sudanese 
nationality if he has acquired, de jure or de facto, the nationality of South Sudan’.27  The 
SNA incorporates the nationality provisions of the NASS as the basis for denationalisation.  
The huge breadth of the South Sudanese nationality provisions makes the Sudanese 
denationalisation provisions truly sweeping.   
 
Importantly, the effects of the provisions of both laws are constitutive (performative) rather 
than constative (descriptive).
28
  They operate ex lege without further, intervening, state 
action.  As an individual falls within the scope of the criteria for South Sudanese nationality 
                                                          
24
 ILC Draft Articles (n 7), art. 13. 
25
 ILC Draft Articles (n 7), art. 13 commentary  para 1. 
26
 ILC Draft Articles (n 7), art. 13 commentary  para 1. 
27
 Sudanese Nationality Act (n 4), art. 10(2). 
28
 Sanderson (n 5), 218-219, 227-228. 
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they are denationalised by operation of the Sudanese law.  Any later determinations with 
respect to either the acquisition or loss of nationality are merely declarative.  Official 
recognition does not make someone a national of South Sudan but declares them to be one.  
They do not become a national because of their recognition by the authorities, but are 
recognised by the authorities because they are a national.  
 
For individuals who are already resident in South Sudan and who fall within the acquisition 
criteria of the NASS the combined effect of these two laws provides an efficient mechanism 
for ‘re-nationalisation’ from Sudanese to South Sudanese citizenship.  However, the South 
Sudanese acquisition criteria are sufficiently sweeping so as to include many individuals 
resident outside of South Sudan.  It is commonly estimated that up to half a million 
individuals from South Sudan remain resident in Sudan.
29
  The combined effect of these laws 
is to renationalise these individuals to citizenship of a state where they are no longer (or, 
indeed, never were) resident and so leaving them without effective national protection in their 
actual place of residence.
30
 
 
5.  De Jure and De Facto Acquisition 
 
The appearance of the words de facto and de jure in Article 10(2) as conditions for the 
acquisition of nationality is striking.  It is tempting to attribute to them some role in 
determining the extent of the Sudanese denationalisation provisions.  This point has already 
                                                          
29
 Refugees International South Sudan Nationality: Commitment Now Avoids Conflict Later, 29 May 2012 
<http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/052912_South_Sudan_Nationality%20letterhead.pdf> 
accessed 1 August 2013, 2. 
30
 Bronwen Manby, The Right to a Nationality and the Secession of South Sudan: A Commentary on the Impact 
of the New Laws Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa 18 June 2012: 
<http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/right-nationality-and-secession-south-sudan-
commentary-20120618.pdf> accessed 15 July 2013, 5. 
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been picked up by some in the NGO community.
31
  However, the reference in the Sudanese 
Act is to the de facto acquisition of nationality, rather than the acquisition of de facto 
nationality.  What must be established de facto for the operation of Article 10(2) is not actual 
state protection but the legal fact of acquisition.  Due to the constitutive structure of Article 8 
of the NASS individuals acquire nationality as soon as they meet the criteria in that Article.  
The legal fact of acquisition is both de jure and de facto without further or intervening 
administrative measures.  The addition of de facto acquisition as a condition for 
denationalisation adds nothing to ordinary legal (de jure) acquisition.  Although Human 
Rights Watch has stated that ‘[t]he fact that a person is eligible to be a citizen of South Sudan 
is not to say he or she has acquired South Sudanese citizenship’32 this is incorrect.  In fact, 
that is exactly what this means.  
 
5.1  Resulting De Jure Statelessness 
 
The interaction between these two laws can make the analysis of any resulting statelessness a 
complicated exercise.  At first blush it might seem that, due to the constitutive nature of the 
South Sudanese nationality provisions and the manner in which they have been incorporated 
into the Sudanese law, anyone denationalised by operation of the Sudanese law will 
necessarily have acquired citizenship of South Sudan.  The denationalisation procedures of 
the Sudanese law do not operate unless and until the individual acquires the nationality of 
South Sudan.  Where the individual does not acquire South Sudanese citizenship the 
Sudanese denationalisation provisions do not apply: expressio unius est exclusio alterius.  
This appears to eliminate any potential for resulting de jure statelessness. 
 
                                                          
31
 see, eg, Manby (n 30); Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan: Don’t Strip Citizenship Arbitrarily’ 2 March 2012 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/02/sudan-don-t-strip-citizenship-arbitrarily> accessed 18 July 2013. 
32
 Human Rights Watch (n 31) 
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Although superficially, both stages (the acquisition of citizenship and subsequent 
denationalisation) appear to depend on shared criteria (acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship) this is misleading for two reasons.  Firstly, this criteria are complex and depend 
upon the evaluation of civil evidence relating to family relationships
33
, ethnicity
34
 and, in 
some cases, continuous residency in South Sudan.
35
  Although the South Sudanese law 
appears comprehensive with respect to the grounds for the acquisition of citizenship it 
provides no guidance as to, for example, the meaning of ‘belonging’ to an indigenous ethnic 
group.
36
  Whereas some provision is made in the implementing regulations for the use of oral 
evidence where documentary evidence is unavailable it is unclear what standards of 
admissibility or proof will apply in the course of such proceedings.
37
  This is particularly 
important in the context of South Sudan where, in part due to the recent history of civil 
disorder and resulting displacement, it can be expected that many will lack the civil 
documents needed to establish their nationality claim under the NASS.
38
 
 
While the acquisition provisions are constitutive in practice, they require confirmation by the 
state authorities (even if this is only declarative in effect) if they are to be effective as a 
guarantee of national protection and other, corollary, public entitlements.  Where, as in the 
present case, each state reserves to itself the right to determine the fact of acquisition it is 
virtually inevitable that substantively different criteria will be applied by each state.  Any 
determination made by the Sudanese authorities in respect of denationalisation will require a 
prior determination (by the same authority) as to the acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship.  However, any determination made by the Sudanese authorities as to the fact of 
                                                          
33
 Nationality Act (South Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(1)a. 
34
 Nationality Act (South Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(1)b. 
35
 Nationality Act (South Sudan) (n 3), art. 8(2). 
36
 Sanderson (n 5), 212-215. 
37
 Nationality Regulations 2011 (South Sudan), s 1(26). 
38
 Manby (n 30), 5. 
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acquisition will not influence any later determinations by the South Sudanese authorities 
themselves.  It remains to be seen whether the Sudanese authorities will accept decisions 
made by the South Sudanese authorities as to the acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship as 
determinative for the purposes of denationalisation proceedings in Sudan.  As a result, the 
individual will be rendered de jure stateless regardless of what might be the potential for a 
later or further application for citizenship.
39
  
 
Even where an application for South Sudanese citizenship is not refused outright it is 
predictable that there will be significant delays in regularizing the South Sudanese citizenship 
procedures as the country works to improve their own internal administrative capacity. 
Where this produces an undue delay in confirming the acquisition of South Sudanese 
citizenship the process of substitution should be regarded as incomplete.  The individual may 
have been prevented from confirming their acquisition of South Sudanese citizenship due to 
simple error or lack of administrative capacity.  Nevertheless, during the period of this delay 
they are not ‘(…) considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.’40 And, 
as such, are left as de jure stateless. 
 
This is true regardless of the constitutive nature of the South Sudanese acquisition provisions.  
It may be that a reasonable outside observer (or foreign state, such as Sudan) would interpret 
those provisions as applied to have granted South Sudanese citizenship in a particular case.  
This may, in fact, be an unavoidable conclusion.  Nevertheless, should the relevant 
administrative body in South Sudan deny or unduly delay recognition (even if this is only a 
declarative measure and even if this is done wholly capriciously) the practical effect of this is 
                                                          
39
 ‘The Article 1(1) definition employs the present tense (“who is…”) and so the test is whether a person is 
considered as a national at the time the case is examined and not whether he or she might be able to acquire the 
nationality in the future.’  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Meeting ‘The Concept of Stateless 
Persons under International Law’ ("Prato Conclusions") May 2010 
40
 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 360 UNTS 117, art. 1(1). 
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to fail to consider that individual as a South Sudanese national under operation of its law.  
The judgment as to whether an individual is stateless within the meaning of Article 1(1) of 
the 1954 Stateless Convention is an essentially subjective one and must be viewed from the 
perspective of the responsible granting state.
41
  It does not matter if the individual is 
manifestly entitled or, indeed, has actually received citizenship by operation of that state’s 
nationality law if the state itself does not accept that this is the case.  The relevant inquiry in 
the context of de jure statelessness is whether the state apparatus itself considers the 
individual to have acquired their nationality.  
 
5.2  Resulting De Facto Statelessness 
 
While many of the individuals ‘re-nationalised’ to the citizenship of South Sudan will either 
be resident in South Sudan or actively seeking to return, up to half a million individuals of 
South Sudanese origin remain in Sudan.
42
  Those who remain in Sudan have been subjected 
to a range of discriminatory measures.  Some have now lost their jobs and homes and are 
unable to access basic public services such as schools and health clinics.
43
  In practice, 
opportunities for return to South Sudan remain extremely limited even for those actively 
seeking to do so.  International funding for returns was exhausted by February 2012
44
 and the 
consequent reduction in return programmes has left many stranded either inside Sudan or at 
key transit points just across the South Sudanese border.
45
  While some small-scale convoys 
                                                          
41
 For a detailed discussion of the correct interpretation of Article 1(1) of the 1954 Stateless Convention see 
Mike Sanderson ‘South Sudanese in Sudan: Two Key Protection Threats’ Northwestern University Journal of 
International Human Rights (Forthcoming) 
42
 Refugees International (n 29), 2. 
43
 Manby (n 30), 5. 
44
 Ian Timberlake, ‘Convoy takes South Sudanese Home from Khartoum’ Agence France-Presse 19 March 
2013 <http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/convoy-takes-south-sudanese-home-khartoum> accessed 15 April 2013. 
45
 IOM ‘IOM, Partners Highlight Continued Plight of Stranded South Sudanese’ (5 March 2013) 
<http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2013/pbn-listing/iom-
partners-highlight-continued.html> accessed 15 April 2013; IOM South Sudan Project Compendium 2013, 3 
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continue to return to South Sudan, approximately 40,000 people remain stranded at return 
points around Khartoum.
46
 
 
The acquisition of nationality does not amount to good national protection for those who 
remain outside their country of citizenship.  Without meaningful protection they are de facto 
stateless as defined in the recent UNHCR expert conclusions on The Concept of Stateless 
Persons under International Law, 
 
(…) [D]e facto stateless persons are persons outside the country of their nationality who 
are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of 
that country.
47
 
 
Where South Sudan is unwilling or unable to extend its protection to its nationals abroad, 
including practical assistance for return, these people are left as de facto stateless.  This 
serves to highlight an important protection gap.  Although there is an extremely well-
articulated treaty regime for the protection of de jure stateless persons as defined by Article 
1(1) of the 1954 Statelessness Convention including, most notably, the 1954 and 1961 
Statelessness Conventions, there is no similar regime for the protection of de facto stateless 
persons.
48
  Instead, they must rely on any discretionary measures that might be adopted by 
interested states.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM_South_Sudan_2013_Country_Programme.pdf
> accessed 15 April 2013. 
46
 Timberlake (n 44); OCHA, ‘Sudan: Families from South Sudan Stranded in Khartoum’ (6 March 2013) 
<http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/node/2176> accessed 15 July 2013. 
47
 Prato Conclusions (n 39), 6  para A(2). 
48
 Prato Conclusions (n 39), 5. 
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The amended nationality regimes of Sudan and South Sudan together produce a significantly 
increased risk of both de jure and de facto statelessness.  The involuntary substitution of 
nationality following state succession is well-established in state practice.  However, by 
abandoning the test of habitual residence the South Sudanese provisions now fail to 
effectively reconcile the citizenship of individuals resident in its territory to the sovereignty 
of the new state. This is aggravated by the provisions of the Sudanese law which purport to 
automatically denationalise individuals following their acquisition of South Sudanese 
nationality. Their combined effect is to strip those individuals with ethnic or familial 
connections to South Sudan of their Sudanese nationality.  Those individuals who are 
subsequently unable to confirm their citizenship of South Sudan will be rendered de jure 
stateless while the many who lack effective state protection and remain stranded outside 
South Sudan are left as de facto stateless.    
 
Perhaps most significantly, neither law provides a mechanism by which the wishes of 
individuals might be taken into account in respect of their own nationality.
49
  This is 
comparatively unimportant when nationality is attributed on the basis of habitual residence.  
It can be sensibly assumed that individuals prefer to acquire or retain the nationality of the 
state where they are resident.  However, the new South Sudanese law operates to 
automatically attribute citizenship to innumerable individuals of South Sudanese ethnic 
and/or familial origins living outside of South Sudan with effects for them in relation to their 
other nationality and/or immigration status abroad that as of yet can be only surmised.
50
 At 
                                                          
49
 Cf ‘States concerned shall give consideration to the will of persons concerned whenever those persons are 
qualified to acquire the nationality of two or more States concerned.’ ILC Draft Article (n 7), art. 11(1) 
50
 For discussion of some of the unintended effects of the automatic acquisition of a second nationality see 
Sanderson (n 5), 215-217  
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the same time, the Sudanese law operates to denationalise ex lege up to half million residents 
of Sudan.  
 
The process of substitution is an important exception to the general rule in public 
international law against involuntary denationalisation and is specific to state succession.  It 
is intended to improve protection for individuals who would otherwise be left outside their 
country of nationality due to territorial change or the dissolution of their former state.  In the 
present context, this process fails to adequately address this key policy aim and leaves a 
significant minority of the Sudanese and South Sudanese populations without meaningful 
national protection. 
